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PERSPECTIVES
United States International
Competitiveness and Trade Policies
for the 1980s
Senator Dan Quayle*
A new wave of protectionism is upon us and its undertow, if not
the wave itself, constitutes a serious threat to the Western alliance.
This "neo-protectionism" differs from familiar past practices of relying
heavily on higher tariffs; it is more often characterized by the use of
more subtle ploys such as dumping, subsidization, and the erection of
difficult marketing requirements for foreign traders.
Unfortunately, our allies thus far have generally failed to realize
that their neo-protectionist practices are creating a serious trade prob-
lem. Recently, for example, the Speaker of the French General Assem-
bly facetiously remarked to me that what Europe really needs is
another Marshall Plan. Thus, some Europeans apparently hope that
the economically strong United States will once again "bail-out" its
European allies. There is little recognition in Europe that the mainte-
nance of unsubsidized free trade and access to markets is as much their
responsibility as it is our own. The sooner Europeans realize this, the
better off we all will be.
When one reflects on the underlying causes of international hostil-
United States Senator, Indiana. The author acknowledges the research assistance of Bar-
bara N. McLennan and Tom Duesterberg of his legislative staff.
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ities and the decline of the economic vitality of certain Western nations,
the usual focus is on respective weaknesses in military preparedness.
Clearly, the Western alliance must establish a viable deterrent to the
Soviet threat. However, continued economic and trade failure may
well constitute a more serious threat to the future peace and prosperity
of Western nations. One does not need to be reminded that economic
distress triggered World Wars I and II as much as did expansionist
military policies. Indeed, the military policies resulted in part from the
economic chaos.
In this time when the possibility of nuclear holocaust exists, it is
easy to emphasize our military concerns over the requirements for sta-
ble economic growth and development. Our greatest challenge for the
long term, however, must be to preserve a viable and open interna-
tional trading order. Protectionism will lead only to economic ruin and
greatly increased international tension.
I. THE COMPLEXITY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE
LAWS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
In the United States today, the severe 1981-1983 recession has led
to an increase in domestic unemployment. This unemployment has
been particularly marked in specific industries, most notably the steel
and auto industries.' Some commentators2 have noted that pressures
towards protectionism, a phenomenon partially due to the recession,
could lead to a "replay of the 1930s, ' '3 a decade when international
trade nearly ground to a complete halt. As in the 1930s, people in some
quarters attribute our domestic economic problems to the actions of
foreign powers, and not to our own policies and economic perform-
ance.4 Indeed, if Congress responds to these people, we may see Con-
gress pass the present day equivalent of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of
1930.1 The Smoot-Hawley Tariff stifled international trade, deepened
the Great Depression, and set the stage for the economic and military
upheavals which were to occur at the end of the 1930s.
6
Instead, our response today should be in terms of efforts to im-
See Cowan, Despite a Recovery, High Jobless Rate is Expected During the Next Two Years,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1983, § 4, at 4, col. 2.
2 See, e.g., Kirkland, Washington's Trade War of Words, FORTUNE, Apr. 5, 1982, at 35; A
Global Trade War on the Way?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 1, 1982, at 57.
3 Greene, The New Protectionism, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 2 (1981).
4 See Pine, Protectionist Push: Threat of a Trade War Rises as Recession Spurs Competition,
Nations Impose Curbs, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1982, at 54, col. 1.
5 Pub. L. No. 361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
6 For a discussion of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the circumstances which surrounded it,
see J. DOBSON, Two CENTURIES OF TARIFFS 33-34 (1976).
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prove trade. This requires that the issues of international trade and
competition be addressed with a sensitivity for the complexity of the
international economic system. Unfair trade practices affect interna-
tional trade, but so do such factors as the international currency ex-
change rate system, comparative levels of interest rates, and
comparative levels of productivity.
A sensible paradigm for future efforts is provided by the laws of
comparative advantage. Countries are best off when they specialize; in
this way they can keep as high as possible the quality of the manufac-
tured goods and services in which they have a comparative advantage.
An appropriate trade policy for all countries, assuming a free and fair
international marketplace, is to export those products for which they
have a comparative advantage while importing those products at which
they are at a comparative disadvantage. In this way, consumers in all
trading nations can enjoy the highest quality products at the lowest
possible price.
Protection by individual countries of particular products or indus-
tries, whether through the use of tariffs or non-tariff barriers, represents
government sanction of economic inefficiency and almost always in-
volves a cost to the consumer. Often, the effect of such policies is to
raise the price of products above that which a free international market
would set. The only way to protect higher-priced domestic products is
to raise artificially the price which the domestic purchaser pays for
otherwise lower-cost, imported merchandise. The consumer in the end
loses the opportunity to purchase a product at its more efficient, lower
cost.
United States international trade policies must seek to promote the
efficient operation of a free and fair system of international trade. We
must reduce and eliminate quotas and subsidies that protect the ineffi-
cient and raise costs for everyone. We must minimize our own use of
such policies, and also persuade our trading partners that it would be to
their advantage to do the same.
We must also recognize that our recent difficulties in international
commerce are the result of a number of complex factors. Our recent
very high rate of interest has caused a relatively high valuation for the
United States dollar in international markets.7 This valuation has had
the effect of raising the price of United States goods in international
markets and has had a direct impact on our ability to sell products
abroad.
7 See U.S Dollar Shows UnexpectedStrength Since Start of'83, Aidedby Interest Rates, Wall
St. J., Jan. 31, 1983, at 28, col. 2.
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In addition, it is clear that United States levels of productivity
growth have declined in recent years. This has to some extent affected
our ability to compete internationally with products manufactured in
countries that have had rapid gains in technological improvement and
in labor productivity.
Finally, it is clear that some of our major trading partners have
pursued policies that have placed unfair trade burdens on some United
States industries. This is an especially controversial issue during this
period of world recession, when the unemployment rates in many in-
dustrialized countries are unacceptably high.8 We must strive to re-
duce trade burdens fairly and equitably. Otherwise, the imminent
disruption and possible destruction of international trade will add to
the severity of the current world recession, and will ultimately be harm-
ful to all importing and exporting nations.
This perspective analyzes trends in United States trade and pro-
ductivity growth, compares them to trends in other industrialized na-
tions, and suggests that one way to make United States industries more
competitive in the international market is to make them more produc-
tive. The perspective also discuss the business subsidies which the
United States gives to its sugar industry, and which other countries give
to their steel industries, and analyzes the range of current legislative
proposals which may affect international trade. It is argued that the
United States must continue its leadership in striving for a free and
open international trade system by removing the subsidies which it now
maintains, and by compelling other countries to do the same. Since the
United States has already removed most of its trade barriers, however,
there must be new legislation to allow the United States to retaliate
against countries which have not reciprocated by removing their own
trade barriers. The United States must not move in the opposite direc-
tion and retaliate by re-erecting trade barriers equivalent to the barriers
which its trading partners continue to maintain. Such a policy would
be counterproductive, and, indeed, might lead to a trade war.
II. ARE UNITED STATES GOODS AND SERVICES INTERNATIONALLY
COMPETITIVE?
Since 1970, the United States has suffered recurring deficits in its
balance of trade. The value of our exports has not kept up with the
value of our imports, and this problem recently has reached nearly cri-
sis proportions. Table 1 summarizes the trend in United States export
performance between 1970 and 1980.
8 See Lewis, Threshold of Sanity, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1982, at 27.
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While United States exports increased at an annual rate of approxi-
mately 13% in the first half of the 1970s, exports increased by only 7%
in 1976 and 5% in 1977. At the same time, imports, which had in-
creased at an annual rate of 12% in the first half of the decade, grew by
25% in 1976 and 21% in 1977.10
United States export performance also declined in comparison to
other industrial countries. In 1970, the United States accounted for
18% of all goods and 21.3% of all manufactured goods exported by ma-
jor Western industrial countries." In 1978, the United States shares
were 14.2% and 17%, respectively.'2 The United States loss of export
shares was largely the result of increased shares by Japan and West
Germany.
United States export performance improved in the period 1978-
1980, with total exports increasing by 18.5% in 1978, 26.5% in 1979, and
21% in 1980.' 3 In 1979, the value of the United States share of world
manufactured exports increased to 17.4% (from 17% in 1978), the first
such increase in recent years. 14 This improvement continued in 1980
and, by the fourth quarter of that year, the United States share was
18.3%. '
5
However, in 1981, largely due to the rapid appreciation of the dol-
lar and relative weakening of the economies of major United States
trading partners, United States export performance worsened. Exports
grew nominally at less than 6% (an actual decline after allowing for
inflation).' 6 The United States share of exports of manufactures, after
peaking at 21.6% in the second quarter of 1981, declined to 2 1.1% in the
third quarter.'
7
Table 2 shows the levels of exports, imports, and other compo-
nents of the United States current account for the years 1977-1981. The
current account balance includes trade in services as well as merchan-
dise and net unilateral transfers, such as pension payments, private
10 Krueger, U.S. International Transactions, First Quarter 1981, SURV. CURRENT Bus., Aug.
1981, at 31 (Table A.: Summary of U.S. International Transactions).
11 See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, HANDBOOK OF
ECONOMIC STATISTICS 1982, at 80 (Table 52: Exports by Selected Non-Communist Countries).
12 Id.
13 See U.S. DEP'T OF COM., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1981, at 843 (Table No. 1508: Exports and Imports of Merchandise: 1960-1980)
[hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1981].
14 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, supra note 11, at 80.
15 DiLullo, U.S. International Transactions, Third Quarter 1981, SuRv. CURRENT Bus., Dec.
1981, at 31 (Table A: Summary of U.S. International Transactions).
16 U.S. DEP'T COM. INT'L TRADE ADMIN., INT'L ECON. INDICATORS, Mar. 1982, at 21.
17 DiLullo, supra note 15, at 31.
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gifts, and unilateral government grants. After successive deficits of
$14.1 billion in 1977 and 1978, the United States current account regis-
tered small surpluses in 1979 and 1980, despite sizeable merchandise
trade deficits.
For 1981, the current account surplus of $6.6 billion was the high-
est in five years. This was somewhat surprising, considering the appre-
ciation of the dollar and the merchandise trade deficit of $27.8 billion
on a balance bf payments basis. Income from services, however, was
strong, yielding a surplus of $11.0 billion in each of the last two
quarters alone. Much of the increase in service income, however, did
not come from exports but rather from higher private investment re-
ceipts from abroad. These were mainly from investments in petroleum
and manufacturing, as well as from bank interest.19 While such re-
ceipts benefit the domestic economy, they do not directly create jobs as
would exports of goods or services (such as transportation or
insurance).
A preliminary estimate for the 1982 United States current account
balance is a deficit of $8.8 billion.20 This swing into deficit was due to a
worsening merchandise trade deficit. United States exports did not
keep up with* the growth in imports because of sluggish recovery of
foreign economies combined with a relatively strong United States dol-
lar. For the first three quarters of 1982, the United States had an esti-
mated merchandise trade deficit of about $24 billion.2 ' At least one
forecaster expects the merchandise trade deficit to exceed $29 billion
for the entire year.' The current account deficit is likely to continue
into 1983.23
The long-term decline in the United States performance in inter-
national trade coincides with an overall drop in United States produc-
tivity growth rates. Annual increases in manufacturing output per
worker in the United States have, on the average, been lower than that
of most of our major trading partners over the last twenty years.24 At
19 U.S. DET OF COM., BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T COM. NEWS, Mar. 18, 1982.
20 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS 283 (1983) (Table
B-107: World trade balance and current account balances, 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1979-82).
21 See id at 278 (Table B-102: U.S. merchandise exports and imports by principal end-use
category, 1965-82).
22 DATA RESOURCES, INC., DATE RESOURCES U.S. REV., Dec. 1981, at 1.75 (Table 8.1: A
Breakdown of the U.S. Current Account Balance) (a copy of this source is on file at the offices of
the Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).
23 Data Resources, Inc. projects at United States current account balance deficit of $30 million
for 1983. Id
24 SENATE SUBCOMM. ON EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY OF THE COMM. ON LABOR AND
HUMAN RESOURCES, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., PRODUCTIVITY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: RE-
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the same time, as Table 3 indicates, our average rate of capital invest-





































For comparative purposes output is measured at current factor cost.





The results of our low productivity growth in manufacturing have
profound implications for international trade. Over time, our indus-
trial plants in certain industries have become obsolete and inefficient
compared to the newer, more highly automated plants in other coun-
tries.26 Today, products made in other countries are often of high qual-
ity and less expensive than their American equivalents. These
differentials have allowed foreign products to enter the American mar-
ket, where consumers have sought to maximize their purchasing power
during a period of rapid inflation. The result has been a weakening of
American industry, lay-offs, and unemployment. Unless United States
industry responds with heavier capital investment and modernization
of industrial plants, it is in danger of permanently losing domestic sales
as well as foreign markets.
PORT AND FINDINGS 6 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as PRODUCTIVrrY AND THE AMEIu-
CAN ECONOMY].
25 This table is reprinted from: COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, STIMULATING
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 3 (1980) (data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics).
26 PRODUCTIVITY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, supra note 24, at 1-2 (discussion of the
United States steel industry).
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The causes of our long-term decline in productivity growth are
deep-seated and complex. They derive from habits and policies that
spur domestic consumption at the expense of savings and investment.
This has led to a relative decline in our traditional support for research
and development. We have much to do to retrain and educate our
work force to deal with new processes and technologies. We must also
improve the quality of our management, and improve the relations be-
tween labor and management.27
Today, we are faced with policies which do not mesh with the
changes that have taken place in our society over the past decade or
two. For example, despite some pro-investment incentives in the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), 8 current tax policies en-
courage consumption and extend credit for the interest accrued on
expenses. Because inflation has eroded buying power over the last sev-
eral years, individuals have attempted to convert their income to goods
and real property as a hedge against inflation. While this tendency has
possibly come to a halt, as the decline in the real cost of housing, art,
gold, diamonds, and antiques suggests, the recent national tendency to
consume rather than to save has resulted in a national average ratio of
savings to disposable income below that of any other major industrial
nation. Indeed, the United States ratio is less than one-fourth the aver-
ages of Italy and Japan; only one-third that of France, Germany and
the United Kingdom; and less than half that of Canada. 9
Individuals' reluctance to save has led to diminished capital avail-
able for investment. Currently high interest rates, largely a result of
past inflation and perceptions of high future risk, have meant that busi-
nesses cannot borrow to expand and update their operations. One re-
sult of the reduction in capital available for investment and the
inability of businesses to expand has been a downward trend in our
capital-labor ratio. As already noted, due to a combination of long-
term domestic economic policies and other countries' rapid productiv-
ity growth, American plants and businesses today are often not
equipped with the efficient equipment or up-to-date materials found in
the plants of other countries.
30
At the same time that the labor force in the United States has ex-
perienced an increase in growth due to a large influx of women and
27 Id at 9-17.
28 Pub. L. No. 97-34, tit. I, 95 Stat. 176, 176 (1981).
29 U.S. DEP'T OF COM.. INT'L TRADE ADMIN., INT'L ECON. INDICATORS, June, 1980, at 12;
U.S. DEP'T OF COM., INT'L TRADE ADMIN., INT'L ECON. INDICATORS, June, 1979, at 12-13 (statis-
tics reprinted in PRODUCTIVITY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, supra note 24, at 5).
30 See supra text accompanying note 26.
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inexperienced youth, the country's capital stock has grown at a reduced
rate. From 1947 to 1973, capital stock grew at an average annual rate
of about 4%.31 Since 1973, however, this average has been less than
2.5%.32 Net of depreciation, capital per full- and part-time employed
person rose at an average annual rate of about 2.37-2.71% from 1948
until 1973, but fell to about .77% thereafter. 33 Table 4 shows that aver-
age annual growth in gross domestic product per employed person has
been lower in the United States than for any industrialized country
from 1960 through 1979, with the 1970s showing a significant propor-
tional drop compared to the 1960s.
Table 4: Average Annual Growth in Gross Domestic Product Per
Employed Person in Leading Industrial Countries, 1960-1979
(Percent change per year)
34
Country 1960 to 1979a 1960 to 1970 1970 to 1979a
United States 1.5 2.0 1.1
Belgium 3.7 4.2 3.2
Canada 1.9 2.3 1.3
France 4.2 4.9 3.4
Germany 3.9 4.4 3.4
Italy 4.6 6.4 2.6
Japan 7.1 9.5 4.5
Netherlandsb.. 3.6 4.0 3.3
United Kingdom 2.4 2.7 2.0
a Data for 1979 are preliminary.
b Employment figures for the Netherlands are Dutch estimates of work-years
of employed persons.
A major side-effect of the declines in personal savings and the ero-
sion of buying power is the dramatic decline in our research and devel-
opment (R&D) activities. Total spending in the United States for
R&D declined from a peak 2.91% of GNP in 1965 to 2.27% in 1978.11
In contrast, many of our competitors have, in recent years, increased
their R&D spending in relation to their GNP. In the past twenty years,
R&D/GNP ratios have been rising substantially in Japan, France, and
Germany.36 These are the countries that now constitute our most vig-
31 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE PRODUCTIVITY PROBLEM: ALTERNATIVEs FOR Ac-
TION 34 (1981).
32 d
33 Id at 33 (Table 12: Various Measures of the Growth in Capital and the Ratio of Capital to
Labor in the Nonfarm, Nonresidential Business Sector).
34 This table is reprinted from: CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFicE, supra note 31, at 136
(previously unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics).
35 Id at 69.
36 .d. at 71.
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orous rivals in international trade. In addition, a large portion of
United States R&D has been devoted to defense and space research; in
contrast, Japan and other European countries have concentrated on
manufacturing and industrial R&D. 37
Because there is a lag between the time R&D is developed and the
time it is applied to industry and becomes profitable, it is unclear how
much the decline in R&D spending has caused the slow-down in pro-
ductivity. Yet, R&D is a source of new knowledge and technologies.
Ultimately, R&D stimulates productivity growth.
Increased support for R&D should encourage the growth of new
technologies such as biotechnology and energy technology. It should
also improve output per worker-hour through the increased use of
robotics and other new manufacturing techniques. Innovation is likely
to respond to such basic factors as the prospect of economic gain and
improved quality of business management. While the government
plays a secondary role in this process, it can encourage or discourage
innovation through its policies in such areas as taxation, business regu-
lation, patent law, support for scientific investigation, and the dissemi-
nation of information.
Today, however, we are paying a heavy price in international
trade for the slowdown in savings, investment, and research activities
which began in the late 1960s. The overall level of United States pro-
ductivity is still somewhat higher than the level in all other industrial
nations, even though our growth rate has declined over a fairly long
period. Although our manufacturing sector has always been a world
leader in the use of technological innovation to improve productivity,
our international competitors are rapidly catching up. In 1980, exports
of manufactured goods accounted for 65% of the value of all United
States exports, about the same percentage as in 1970. It is therefore
essential for us to stimulate our manufacturing productivity growth
rates to retain our share of the international market and to stimulate
the growth of civilian employment.3"
37 Id. at 74.
38 Productivity in the American Economy, 1982: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment
and Productivity of the Senate Comm on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 629
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Productivity] (article by Kenneth McLennen, Vice Presi-
dent and Director of Industrial Studies, Committee for Economic Development).
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III. A WRONG APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
UNITED STATES SUGAR SUBSIDY
A. Productivity in the United States Sugar Industry
United States agriculture has, to a large extent, been immune to
the slow-down in productivity growth which has affected the industrial
sector. Improvements in machinery, fertilizers, and, most importantly,
improvements in modem hybrid seeds have contributed to constant
growth in both productivity and output. Steady growth in worldwide
demand kept agricultural prices generally strong throughout the 1960s
and 1970s, and provided the earnings needed for improved mechaniza-
tion and the use of the new technologies in modem fertilizers and
seeds. Total exports of agricultural products grew from an average of
$5.4 billion in 1960-6411 to almost $43.5 billion in 1981.4
Productivity on United States farms has advanced almost expo-
nentially since 1950. Table 5 provides an index of productivity growth
in terms of farm output per hour of labor for all agriculture and for
selected products.
Table 5: Farm Productivity Output per Labor Hour4 '
All All Feed
Products Livestock Crops Grains Cotton Sugar
1950 34 37 36 22 26 38
1955 44 46 45 30 39 53
1960 65 62 66 57 57 78
1965 89 86 90 91 102 88
1970 115 121 111 109 136 116
1975 152 160 142 156 255 134
1979a 198 222 182 221 571 145
1967 = 100
a Data for 1979 are preliminary.
This productivity growth has allowed the United States to main-
tain its comparative advantage in the world agricultural trade of such
basic commodities as wheat, coin, and soybeans. Although a few coun-
tries have bettered the United States yields on one or more of these
crops, United States productivity remains well above the world aver-
39 U.S. DEP'T OF COM., BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, BUSINESS STATISTICS 99 (1979) (Table:
Foreign Trade of the United States, Value of Exports).
40 U.S. DEP'T OF COM., BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, SuRv. CURRENT Bus., Oct. 1982, at S-
17 (Table: Foreign Trade of the United States, Value of Exports, Agricultural Products, Total).
41 Source of data in Table 5: STATISTICAL ABsTRACT 1981, supra note 13, at 681 (Table No.
1211: Farm Productivity -Labor-Hours and Indexes of Farm Output per Hour).
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age.42 As a consequence, in 1978 the United States sold 39% of all the
wheat grain, 77% of all the corn, grain, and 77% of all the soybeans
which where traded in international markets.43
Table 6: Yields for Selected Crops, 1978
(Metric Tons per Hectare)'
World Trade
Crop U.S. Western Europe (including U.S.)
Corn 6.33 5.17 3.03
Wheat 2.13 3.69 1.97
Soybeans 2.16 N/A 1.83
Sugar is one of only a few crops that the United States imports in
large quantities. Over the past ten years, we have imported an average
of five million tons of sugar per year.45 Domestic production costs tend
to exceed our competitors' costs because of higher domestic labor, land,
and irrigation costs.46 This disadvantage has not been offset by the
general improvement in domestic agricultural productivity. Table 7 in-
dicates that sugar has lagged behind other crops in terms of labor pro-
ductivity growth since 1966. Additionally, as Table 7 shows, United
States producers now lag behind major competitors in terms of sugar
produced per hectare. One explanation for this lack of productivity
growth is that since 1970, production has increased in mainland grow-
ing areas, often on marginal lands.47
42 See infra infra Table 6 accompanying note 44.
43 U.S. DEP'T OF COM., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1981, at 710 (Table No. 1246).
44 Source of data in Table 6: U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 35-36 (corn);
9-10 (wheat); 133 (soybeans) (1981).
45 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., SUGAR & SWEETENER: OUTLOOK & SITU-
ATION, May 1982, at 21 (No. SSRV7N2).
46 See SCHNITTKER ASSOCIATES, SWEETNER MARKETS AND POLICIES - THE '80s, AN ANALY-
SIS AND COMPENDIUM OF FACTS ch. 2 (1983).
47 See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE U.S.-
SUGAR AND OTHER SWEETENERS: AN INDUSTRY ASSESSMENT 29 (1979).
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Table 7: Yields of Beet and Cane Sugar Crops in Selected
Countries, 1981-1982: Tons per Hectare
48
Cane Sugar Beet Sugar





South Africa 8.72 N/A
Australia 11.27 N/A
Dominican Republic 5.64 N/A
France N/A 8.81





* Hawaiian cane is harvested no more frequently than every 24 months, ex-
plaining the dramatically higher yields.
Reflecting both worldwide overproduction and lower production
costs in most cane-producing nations, the world price of sugar has
fallen from its 1974 level of 30 cents per pound to just under 7 cents per
pound.49 In late 1981, the United States Congress passed and the Presi-
dent signed a bill designed to keep domestic sugar prices substantially
above this level.5 0 This sugar price support program is likely to result
in considerable damage to both the United States economy and to rela-
tions with our trading partners. The program also contravenes the ba-
sic principle of open trade and comparative advantage which has been
the cornerstone of our economic and trading policy.
B. Cost of the Sugar Subsidy to the American Consumer
The problems caused by the sugar program begin with the costs it
imposes on American sugar consumers. For the 1981-1982 crop year,
Congress required sugar to be supported at 16.75 cents per pound.5' To
avoid direct costs to the government, the United States Department of
Agriculture and the President are attempting to keep domestic prices
48 Source of data in Table 7: U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREIGN AGRIC. CIRCULAR: SUGAR,
July 1982, at 18-23 (No. FS 1-82).
49 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRic. EcON. RESEARCH SERV., SUGAR & SWEETENER: OUTLOOK & SITU-
ATION, Sept. 1982, and 5-6 (No. SSRV7N3).
50 Agricultural and Food Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-98, 95 Stat. 1213 (codified in scattered
sections of 7 and 16 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1982)).
51 7 U.S.C.A. § 1446(h)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:1(1983)
above 19.88 cents per pound.5 2 Import duties and fees in effect add
about 7 cents per pound to the world price53 and import quotas drive
up prices another 4 to 5 cents.54 Thus, the current world price of 7
cents is raised by more than 12 cents per pound. Since each additional
penny in sugar prices adds $300 million to the nation's sugar bill, the
total "sugar tax" imposed on American consumers amounts to more
than $3.6 billion on an annual basis. Viewed from another angle, the
sugar program is currently costing each man, woman, and child in this
country about $15.50 per year.5 The sugar support price will rise in
future years, reaching 18 cents per pound in 1985.56
Highly restrictive import quotas imposed to protect sugar prices
involve special problems for domestic sugar users. Over 40% of the
United States sugar supply is imported. 7 In 1981, the United States
imported five million tons of sugar.58 Quotas are expected to be a fac-
tor in reducing this figure to three million tons in 1982.-1" Some spot
shortages of sugar have already occurred in certain areas which depend
on imported sugar. Additionally, since refiners of foreign sugar cannot
be assured of supplies, they may be faced with the prospect of not mak-
ing contracted deliveries to major users such as confectioners, bakers,
soft drink bottlers, and food processors. Unreliable trading partners, as
we have seen in the aftermath of our grain and soybean export embar-
goes, 60 tend to have great difficulties in regaining their markets
or sources of supply. Finally, not the least of the problems caused by
restrictive quotas is that they have raised domestic raw sugar prices
well above the level needed to protect the government support pro-
gram. Although a price of 19.88 cents is all that is needed, excessively
tight quotas have raised the spot price to 23 cents,61 and, thus, have
52 If the domestic market price falls below 19.88 cents per pound, it is more profitable for
growers to sell their sugar directly to the government at 16.75 cents. For an explanation of the
Program, see U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., SUGAR & SWEETENER: OUTLOOK
& SITUATION, Feb. 1982 (No. SSRV7N1).
53 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 45, at 5-7.
54 Id at 7.
55 See generally Sugar Price Rise Hits Consumer: Food, Beverage Concerns Pass Along In-
crease, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1980, at 29, col. 3.
56 7 U.S.C.A. § 1446(h)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
57 CROP REPORTING BOARD, ECON. & STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUGAR
MARKET STATISTICS, June 25, 1981, at 7 (Table 8-Sugar Receipts of Refiners and Importers by
Source of Supply, January-April 1981 and 1980).
58 U.S. DEP'T OF AGKIC., supra note 52, at 12.
59 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 49, at 4, 12.
60 In 1980, President Carter imposed grain and soybean embargoes on the U.S.S.R. in re-
sponse to the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan. See, e.g., NY Times, Jan. 5,
1980, at 1, col. 6.
61 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., SUGAR & SWEETENER: OUTLOOK & SITU-
ATION, May 1981, at 2 (New York Spot Price).
Trade Policies for the 1980s
5:1(1983)
raised costs to sugar users even further than the price which the USDA
and the President have set.
C. Effect of the Sugar Subsidy on United States Foreign Policy
Another major problem caused by our sugar program stems from
its impact on United States foreign policy objectives. Apart from the
fact that the use of import quotas blatantly contradicts our stated policy
of trying to promote a free international trading order, the quotas have
real and immediate effects on our foreign policy in the western hemi-
sphere and in Southeast Asia.
Sugar is a widely produced crop in the tropical climates of the
Caribbean, South America, and Southeast Asia. Many sugar growing
countries depend on this crop for a large part of their export earnings,
and, indeed, for major portions of their GNP.62 In the Dominican Re-
public, for instance, 10% of the population works in the sugar indus-
try. 3 Since over 50% of the sugar from the Dominican Republic is sold
to the United States," the import quotas hit that nation particularly
hard.
The Reagan Administration and its predecessors have emphasized
that the Caribbean and South America must be economically stable in
order to be politically stable. The President has articulated and formal-
ized this policy at least partly in his proposed Caribbean Basin
Initiative.6
Our sugar program, with its system of tariffs and quotas, clearly
undermines United States policy towards the Caribbean and South
America and detracts from the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Addition-
ally, the combination of domestic support programs in the United
States and similar programs in Europe, along with United States im-
port quotas, have helped to drive world sugar prices to their lowest
point in ten years. 66 The depressed world price injures the foreign cur-
62 For example, sugar and sugar byproducts comprised 34% of the Dominican Republic's ex-
port earnings in 1980. Dominican Republic, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., BACK-
GROUND NOTES, Oct. 1981, at 6.
63 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., supra note 47, at 70.
64 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 61, at 27 (Table 3: World Centrifugal Sugar Production
in Specified Countries, Raw Value, 1976/77 to 1980/81); 41 (Table 17: U.S. Sugar Imports by
Country, Annual, 1976-80).
65 See S.2237, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 5900, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The future
of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act is uncertain due to questions about the nature of
its direct economic aid provisions, opposition by domestic industries such as the sugar, footwear,
and leather goods industries to its trade concession proposal, and the reluctance of Congress to
appropriate the funds necessary to implement the Act.
66 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 49, at 5-6; U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH
SERV., SUGAR & SWEETENER: OUTLOOK & SITUATION, Dec. 1982, at 5 (SSRV7N4).
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rency earnings of sugar-producing nations and hinders their ability to
buy from the United States or other foreign producers. Furthermore,
some sugar exporters who depend on United States markets cannot
even sell their sugar.6 7 Indeed, the United States quotas, now in effect
for some countries, are so low that they do not constitute a full ship-
load. The economies of the Dominican Republic, Thailand, the Philip-
pines, Argentina, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Panama, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil are, thus, being buffeted by our
protectionism while we extol the virtues of free trade.
The import quotas have come at a particularly bad time in United
States relations with our American neighbors. The Secretary General
of the Organization of American States (OAS), Mr. Alejandro Orfila,
protested the imposition of quotas on imported sugar in a letter to Pres-
ident Reagan on May 20, 1982:
Even while Latin America has sought to expand its trade horizons, world
prices for commodities such as sugar, coffee, bananas, meat and cotton-
its principal exports-have gone down. As a consequence the region is
not earning the income it requires to offset high hydrocarbon and debt
servicing costs. With the imposition of U.S. quotas and the maintenance
of very high duty rates and import fees on sugar, however forced by un-
forseeable or uncontrollable conditions, the short-term economic outlook
for many Latin American countries has become even more negative. Es-
timates indicate that under these new U.S. measures between mid-May
and June 30, 1982, Latin American exporters will stand to lose about
$16.4 million. This figure, incidentally, may reach perhaps $90 million
over the rest of the year.
68
Mr. Orfila concludes his letter by saying:
Given the overwhelmingly negative attitude in Latin America and the
Caribbean towards these new U.S. measures, it would appear, Mr. Presi-
dent, that reconsideration of alternative policies is urgently required.
Otherwise the prospects both for an economic turnaround in the region
and for a near-term improvement in relations between OAS states can
hardly be optimistic.
69
In addition to undermining the stated foreign policy objective of
the Reagan Administration, the use of import quotas may give ammu-
nition to those who are bristling with protectionist sentiment, both do-
mestically and abroad. We must remember that the United States
enjoys a huge trade surplus in agricultural commodities. In 1981, our
agricultural trade surplus reached $26.5 billion.70 In 1981 alone, we
67 See generally No Sweetsfor the Carribean, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1982, at 30.
68 Letter from Alejandro Orfila, Secretary General, Organization of American States, to Presi-
dent Reagan, May 20, 1982.
69 Id.
70 U.S. DEP'T oF AGRIC., 1982 HANDBOOOK oF AGRICULTURAL CHARTS 61 (1982).
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exported over $2.5 billion worth of wheat and grains to ten major sugar
exporting nations.7 In 1980 we had an agricultural trade surplus of
$6.8 billion with Europe and $5.7 billion with Japan. 2
The possible consequences to United States farmers of a rising spi-
ral of trade restrictions should be of extreme concern. A brief look at
international reaction to United States sugar import quotas reveals the
extent of this danger. On April 26, 1982, Trade Representative Wil-
liam Brock said that sugar import quotas would "make it more diffi-
cult" to press the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan to
ease their restrictions on United States agricultural imports.7 3 On May
14, 1982, an EEC official was quoted as saying he believes United
States sugar import quotas may "help dispel the myth that our agricul-
ture is more subsidized than in the United States."74 On this issue, he
continued, "Americans really live in a glass house and they really
should not throw stones at us."175 On May 17, 1982, Japanese Foreign
Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi told the United States that Japan has vir-
tually ruled out any immediate removal of import restrictions on agri-
cultural products.76 Japanese officials said their government would be
quick to "point out Washington's recent imposition of sugar import
quotas to counter any pressure by the U.S."' 77 Although such state-
ments are the normal rhetoric and posturing of trade negotiations, they
indicate that sugar import quotas will make our efforts to ease existing
trade barriers and to prevent additional restrictions considerably more
difficult.
Domestic sugar producers argue that an EEC sugar price support
program and alleged "dumping" of surplus EEC sugar are the root
cause of depressed world sugar prices.78  They also argue that the
United States sugar program along with sugar import quotas are neces-
sary to protect domestic producers from material injury. Ten sugar
producing nations other than the United States have already petitioned
GATT under article 23 to protest the EEC sugar price support pro-
71 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., FOREIGN AGRIC. TRADE U.S., Nov.-Dec.
1982, at 16-31 (Table 8: Agricultural Exports: Quantity and Value by Commodity and Country).
72 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECON. & STATISTICS SERV., FOREIGN AGRIC. TRADE U.S., May-
June 1981, Table 7.
73 REUTERS WIRE SERVICE REPORTS, April 26, 1982 (Editors note: We were unable to get
copies of the REUTERS WIRE SERVICE REPORTS cited in notes 73-77 by the time of publication to
verify the quotations).
74 REUTERS WIRE SERVICE REPORTS, May 14, 1982.
75 Id.
76 REUTERS WIRE SERVICE REPORTS, May 17, 1982.
77 Id.
78 See the complaint ified with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative by the Great West-
ern Sugar Co., Docket No. 301-22, 46, 49, at 697-701 (1981).
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gram.79 These complainants argue that EEC subsidies have stimulated
production and created a glut of sugar that has depressed world prices.
They also contend that subsidized dumping of sugar on the part of the
EEC is reducing their share of world sugar trade.8 0 GATT is reviewing
the petition of the ten sugar-exporting nations," and the Office of the
United States Trade Representative is still considering the advisability
of a formal petition for a GATT panel on this subject.
Although one cannot deny the existence of the EEC price support
program which guarantees European producers a floor price of about
22 cents per pound for a quota which represents domestic consumption
within the EEC, 2 it is not clear that the EEC "dumping" of surplus
sugar is the sole cause of depressed sugar prices.
It must be kept in mind that sugar prices have been extremely vol-
atile throughout the twentieth century and that the EEC did not begin
exporting sugar until the late 1970s, after a particularly volatile period
for sugar prices. In the 1970s, world sugar prices fluctuated between 7
and 60 cents per pound. 3 In 1972 the average price was 7.43 cents.
8 4
By 1974 it was up to 29.9 cents, but then declined to 7.8 cents in 1977.5
In 1981 alone, the price varied between 11 and 28 cents.8 6
Unfortunately, sugar prices are at the mercy of mother nature.
Much as we might try to place the blame on some outside source, such
as the EEC or United States subsidy programs, sugar prices depend on
supply and demand. Increases in EEC production after 1975, largely
accounted for by increases in productivity, have allowed the Europeans
to enter the export markets. EEC sugar growers may have a cushion
for sugar grown under the quota for European consumption, but they
still must pay for the export subsidies out of their own pockets.8 7
79 The countries are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, In-
dia, Nicaragua, Peru, and The Phillippines.
80 For an expression of this argument, see the Congressional debate on the sugar provision of
the 1981 Farm Bill, 127 CONG. REC. S.9784-9805 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1981).
81 See GAT4TAgrees to Set Up Dispute Panels on Canada's rFIA, EC Fruit Subsidies, [Apr.-
Sept.] U.S. INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA), No. 402, at 16 (Apr. 6, 1982).
82 The EEC's scheme for supporting sugar prices is set out in Council Reg. No. 1785/81 on the
Common Organization of the Market in Sugar, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 177) 1 (1981), as
amended by Council Reg. No. 192/82, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 21) 1 (1982) and Council Reg.
No. 606/82, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 74) 1 (1982).
83 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 45.
84 See id at 6.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 For a description of the EEC Sugar Program, see,4 New Common Organization ofthe Mar-
kets in Sugar as from 1 July, 1981, GREEN EUROPE: NEWSLETTER ON THE COMMON AGRICUL-
TURAL POLICY (1981) (No. 180).
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D. Dangers of Protectionism in the World Sugar Trade
Blaming the Europeans for dumping and depressing world sugar
markets, therefore, will not solve the problems of the United States
sugar industry. Even a cursory examination of the history of sugar
prices reveals their highly cyclical nature. We should admit this fact of
life, and live with the consequences. Blaming the Europeans, much less
retaliating against them, will not rid us of the alleged "need" for the
United States sugar support program. It only deflects our attention
from the economic realities of our own price support program.
The most ironic aspect of using sugar import quotas as a form of
retaliation against the Europeans is that they have relatively little im-
pact on the Europeans themselves. The United States does not import
EEC sugar, so the impact of quotas falls largely on traditional sources
of United States sugar imports, such as Brazil, the Dominican Repub-
lic, the Philippines, Australia, and the Caribbean nations. Quotas only
affect the EEC to the extent that they depress world demand and prices
for sugar. Furthermore, the United States has imposed countervailing
duties on EEC sugar since 1978.88
A much more responsible and less dangerous way to counter any
unfair trading practice by the Europeans or any others is to follow the
well-established mechanisms of GATT to resolve disputes.89 Admit-
tedly, this method is laborious and sometimes frustrating, but the inter-
national trading order formalized in the GATT agreements is worth
preserving. Unilateral action circumventing GATT will only invite the
European nations and others to do the same for commodities such as
corn or soybeans. Such a trade war can only hurt everyone involved.
The price American consumers and American farmers ar1being
asked to pay to protect the domestic sugar industry is simply too high.
Artificial price increases of this widely-used commodity can only set
back United States efforts to bring inflation under control. Subsidiza-
tion of a relatively inefficient industry only deflects needed investment
capital from more productive industries. The private sector needs to
build up its savings, and direct investment of capital in industries
where we have a clear comparative advantage over other nations.
However, the sugar program completely defies this principle. Ameri-
can consumers pay a subsidy of more than $3.6 billion to the United
88 For the final determination on the imposition of these countervailing duties, which are now
set at 3.5%, see 43 Fed. Reg. 33,237 (1978).
89 For a discussion of GATT dispute settlement mechanisms, see de Kieffer, GAIT Dispute
Settlements: A New Beginning in International and U.S. Trade Law, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 317
(1980).
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States sugar industry,90 which serves only to escalate the spiral leading
to protectionism. American sugar producers are protected in a way
that will encourage the EEC, Japan, and South American countries to
create new barriers against other United States agricultural exports.
The international trading order must not be jettisoned so cavalierly to
protect sugar.
Protectionism in international trade is always self-defeating in the
long run. Even in the short run, United States protection of the domes-
tic sugar industry can only reduce world trade because sugar exports
are a vital source of earnings to the developing, sugar-producing na-
tions of South America and Southeast Asia. Without earnings from
sugar, these nations will be unable to buy the feed grains and manufac-
tured goods produced so efficiently in the United States.
In May 1982, Senator Tsongas and I, along with twenty co-spon-
sors, introduced a bill which would eliminate the sugar program alto-
gether.9 It is the opinion of this author that it should be the ultimate
goal of our actions in Congress. In addition, Senator Tsongas and I
have offered an interim plan to reduce the sugar price supports to a
level at which import quotas would not be needed.92 As a step toward
phasing out this costly program of quotas, a reduction in the price sup-
port level would give some relief to United States consumers and allow
the elimination of the import quotas which have been fanning the fires
of a trade war.
IV. THE UNITED STATES STEEL INDUSTRY AND THE ISSUE OF
FOREIGN DUMPING
A. Productivity in the United States Steel Industry
The United States steel industry today is suffering through a pe-
riod of severe recession. In northwest Indiana, between 1979 and 1982,
more than 20,000 steelworkers lost their jobs.93 This undoubtably ac-
counts for a large percentage of the 41,000 people who were unem-
90 See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
91 S.2484, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). This bill has been referred to the Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry. An identical bill, H.R. 6161, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), has
been introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Peyser and has 25 co-sponsors.
This bill has been referred to the House Agriculture Committee.
92 Printed Amendment No. 2016. This amendment was to be offered as a floor amendment to
H.J. Res. 520, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), a joint resolution to extend and raise the public debt
limit. The final version of H.J. Res. 520, Pub. L. No. 97-270, signed into law by the President on
September 30, 1982, however, did not contain the amendment. However, on March 11, 1983,
Senator Tsorgas, Senator Chafee, and I introduced S.788, a bill similar to amendment 2016, in the
97th Congress. S.788, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. S.2676 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1983).
93 128 CONG. REC. S.7263 (daily ed. June 22, 1982) (statement of Senator Quayle).
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ployed in this part of the state in April, 1982.94 The severe economic
decline in the steel industry has forced other businesses in the area to
curtail activities or, worse, to close their doors.95 Clearly, if the Indiana
steel industry was running at a higher capacity, such dire circumstances
would not exist. Much the same situation exists in other steel-produc-
ing regions in the United States.
The current recession in the United States steel industry follows a
long period of decline, caused by a number of complex factors.
Though the United States steel industry was preeminent in the world
market after World War II, it has since lost its international competi-
tiveness and has fallen behind technologically. Table 8 summarizes the
long-term trend in steel exports by principal countries.
Table 8: Exports of Steel Products by Principal Countries
(Selected Years)
9 6
Producer 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1977 1979
(in millions of net tons)
U.S.A. 4.4 2.0 1.7 2.9 2.7 2.0 2.8
(share percentage) (14) (5) (3) (3) (2) (1) (2)
Japan 1.3 2.5 10.4 25.6 39.7 36.8 34.0
EEC 19.4 28.7 36.2 48.9 55.0 58.3 66.9
U.S.S.R. 2.3 3.7 6.0 8.2 8.3 8.3 7.2
Reported World
Exports 30.3 42.7 65.3 101.1 131.6 140.0 151.0
Much of the difficulty which the United States steel industry faces
today is the product of long-term declines in the growth rates for labor
productivity for the industry as a whole. Compared to that of other
nations, particularly Japan, the United States steel industry has seen
large increases in labor costs per ton.97 United States companies have
been slow to introduce technological advances, such as continuous cast-
ing, which would improve labor productivity and reduce energy con-
sumption and pollution. Indeed, no new steel plant has been started in
the United States since 1962.98 Also, rising labor costs have increased
the unit cost of producing a ton of steel in the United States as corn-
94 Id
95 Id
96 Figures in this table are.calculated from data from: INT'L IRON & STEEL INST., WORLD
STEEL ExPoRTS: QUANTITY (periodical published every six months).
97 See Hearings on Productivity, supra note 38, at 48 (statement of Joel S. Hirschhorn, Project
Director, Office of Technology Assessment).
98 See Hearings on Productivity, supra note 38, at 9 (statement of Robert W. Crandall, Brook-
ings Institution).
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pared with Japan,99 our foremost competitor. Today, the value of all
outstanding common stock for the entire steel industry is equal to the
price which United States Steel Corp. paid to acquire Marathon Oil
Corp..1
o
Since the 1974 energy crisis, general worldwide demand for steel
has weakened considerably. At the same time, some developing coun-
tries have tremendously increased their capacity for steel production.
This has created a situation in which United States and European steel
companies face excess capacity, but limited opportunities for ex-
panding their exports.''
The strength of the United States dollar in international exchange
has also weakened the United States steel industry's export prospects.
For example, the strength of the dollar has helped to make the average
foreign exchange cost of steel produced in a United States plant sub-
stantially higher than steel produced in Japan. 0 2 As long as the dollar
maintains its strength relative to other steel producers' currency, its
value will directly affect the ability of United States firms to export,
and ease the entry of foreign steel into United States markets.
B. Protectionism in the World Steel Trade: The Issue
of Foreign Subsidies
The significant problem facing the steel industry is thus caused by
lower productivity, rising unit labor costs, and a strong dollar. How-
ever, the policy of government subsidization of steel by certain foreign
governments, especially those with nationalized steel industries, has ex-
acerbated these problems. If subsidized foreign steel industries can
maintain high levels of investment while they suffer losses which would
bankrupt United States firms, there will be little prospect for reviving
the United States steel industry. 03 Foreign subsidy programs will raise
prices for United States and foreign consumers alike, since they will
keep inefficient plants open and make investment in unsubsidized
United States plants uneconomic.
The United States International Trade Commission (ITC) has ad-
dressed the subsidies issue in some countervailing and antidumping
duty suits, which a number of United States steel companies brought in
January 1982 for relief from steel imports from Europe, Brazil, and
99 Starrels, The Remedies Can Be Found at Home, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1983, § 3, at 2, col. 3.
100 Id. at 10.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 11.
103 See Hearings on Productivity, supra note 38, at 43 (statement of Donald F. Barnett, Vice
President, American Iron & Steel Institutes).
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South Africa. On January 11, 1982, United States Steel Corp., the
Bethlehem Steel Corp., the Republic Steel Corp., the Inland Steel Co.,
Jones & Laughlin Industries, the National Steel Corp., and the Cyclops
Corp. filed petitions under United States countervailing and antidump-
ing duty laws" 0 alleging that low-priced steel imports from eleven
countries had materially injured domestic steel industries. The peti-
tions comprised thirty-eight antidumping and ninety-four counter-
vailing duty complaints and named the following countries: the United
Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Rumania, South Africa, and
Brazil. The products cited were carbon steel plate, hot-rolled carbon
steel, cold-rolled carbon steel sheet, galvanized carbon steel sheet, and
carbon steel structural shapes and steel bars.105
Under United States law, countervailing duties will be imposed
when: (1) the International Trade Commission finds that a domestic
industry is materially injured, or threatened with such injury, by reason
of subsidized imports; and (2) the Department of Commerce (DOC)
determines that a subsidy is in fact being granted. 10 6 Similarly, an-
tidumping duties are imposed when: (1) the ITC finds material injury
due to imports that are being, or likely to be, sold in the United States
at "less than fair value" (LTFV); and (2) the DOC makes an affirma-
tive LTFV determination. 17 The DOC has the discretion whether or
not to initiate an investigation on the basis of allegations made in coun-
tervailing duty0 8 and antidumping petitions.1 9 Once investigations
commence, the ITC and DOC must each make preliminary and, if nec-
essary, final determinations of injury from subsidized" or LTFV im-
ports, in their respective areas, according to a precise statutory
timetable.' The Court of International Trade may review negative
preliminary ITC and DOC determinations, and also may review final
ITC and DOC affirmative and negative findings."
12
Both the countervailing duty and antidumping duty laws have
been written to conform United States procedures to those set forth in
104 47 Fed. Reg. 5739-51 (1982).
105 Id.
106 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (Supp. v 1981).
107 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. V 1981).
108 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(a) (Supp. V 1981).
109 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a) (Supp. V 1981).
110 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 1671d (Supp. V 1981).
111 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b, 1673d (Supp. V 1981).
112 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (Supp. V 1981).
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the subsidies/countervailing duties 1 3 and antidumping agreements,"
14
negotiated under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negoti-
ations. 15 These agreements, which section 2 of the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979 implement, 116 require that imports cause "material" injury
to domestic industries before duties may be imposed. 17 Under United
States law, countries such as South Africa, which are not parties to the
GATT Subsidies/Countervailing Duties Code, or which do not recip-
rocally extend similar benefits to the United States, are not entitled to
an injury test when they are named in countervailing duty petitions.
81 8
On February 18, 1982, the ITC made preliminary affirmative in-
jury determinations in response to eighteen antidumping and twenty
countervailing duty petitions (these generally involving high volume
items), and made negative determinations in response to fifty-two peti-
tions. 119 On March 3, 1982, the United States Steel Corp. appealed to
the United States Court of International Trade to overturn the prelimi-
nary negative findings regarding hot-rolled carbon plate, cold-rolled
steel sheet, and galvanized steel sheet products from various Western
European countries. 120 The ITC, on June 2, 1982, dismissed three
countervailing duty petitions filed against imports from Spain, finding
no reasonable indication of injury, but made a preliminary affirmative
finding with regard to six petitions.' 2 ' Since Spain signed the GATT
113 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles XI, XVI, and XXII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, - U.N.T.S. -.
114 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650, - U.N.T.S. -.
115 For a discussion of the Tokyo Round, see Grahm,A Practitioner s Guide to the Tokyo Round
Trade Negotiations, 4 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 225 (1979); Grahn, Results of the Tokyo
Round, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 153 (1979).
116 19 U.S.C. § 2503 (Supp. V 1981).
117 See id §§ 1671b(a), 167ld(b), 1673b(a), 1673d(b) (Supp. V 1981); see also id § 1677(7)
(Supp. V 1981) (definition of "material injury").
118 See id § 1671. Under section 1671, the procedures under United States countervailing duty
law extend only to countries which have signed the GATT subsidies and countervailing duties
codes (see sources cited supra notes 113-14) or which have assumed obligations "substantially
equivalent" to those under the codes. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981). Also, countervailing
duty procedures will extend to a country which the United States must treat as a "most favored
nation" with respect to goods in question, if the GATT does not apply between the United States
and that country, if a United States agreement with the country does not expressly permit actions
which United States law or the GATT requires, or if a United States agreement with the country
contains "nondiscriminatory prohibitions or restrictions on importation which are designed to
prevent deceptive or unfair practices." Id § 1671(b)(3).
119 47 Fed. Reg. 9087, 10,314 (1982).
120 U.S. Steel Appeals Dismissal by ITC, Similar Actions Weighed by Other Firms, [Oct.-Mar.]
INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA), No. 118, at 551 (Mar. 10, 1982).
121 47 Fed. Reg. 26,038 (1982).
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Subsidies Code during the investigation, Spain was subject to a differ-
ent timetable for injury determinations than the other European coun-
tries named in the various petitions.'
22
On June 10, 1982, the DOC found that Belgium, Brazil, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, South Africa, and the United Kingdom were granting subsidies
through mechanisms such as interest rebates, capital grants, programs
for introducing new technology, exemptions from real property taxes,
and loans to uncreditworthy companies. The subsidies ranged from
amounts of less than 1% to over 40% of the f.o.b. (free on board) value
of the imports.' 23 The DOC also found subsidies in various programs
which the European Communities administered, such as industrial in-
vestment loans, housing loans for workers, and loan guarantees. How-
ever, the DOC did not find that the offending countries subsidized all
of their steel companies.'2 4 It also refused to find the critical circum-
stances necessary to impose retroactive duties, that is, massive imports
over a relatively short period of time. 25 Bethlehem Steel and five other
companies sought retroactive duties, which section 167lb(e) authorizes
in countervailing duty cases.
126
As a result of the DOC determination, United States importers of
the offending products would have been required to post cash or bond
equal to the estimated subsidy, to ensure payment of countervailing
duties, once the DOC made its final determinations of material in-
jury.27 However, on October 22, 1982, President Reagan announced
that the EEC had agreed to cut steel exports to the United States by
about one million tons from the 1981 level, over a three year period.'28
The effect of this agreement would be to reduce the share of European
steel in the United States market from 6.3% to a little over 5%. 129 In
response to the agreement, the United States steel companies, which
originally filed countervailing duty and antidumping petitions against
the European steel producers, withdrew their complaints.' 30
122 Id.
123 47 Fed. Reg. 26,300 (1982).
124 Id at 26,300 (Belgium), 26,3 10 (Brazil), 26,315 (France), 25,321 (Federal Republic of Ger-
many), 26,327 (Italy), 26,331 (Luxembourg), 26,335 (Netherlands), 26,340 (South Africa), 26,343
(United Kingdom).
125 Id at 26,306 (Belgium), 26,314 (Brazil), 26,321 (France), 26,326 (Federal Republic of Ger-
many), 26,330 (Italy), 26,334 (Luxembourg), 26,339 (Netherlands), 26,348 (United Kingdom).
126 19 U.S.C. § 167lb(e) (Supp. V 1981).
127 Id. § 1671(a)(2).
128 Farnsworth, European Plan to Curb Exports of Steelto U.S., N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1982, § 1,
at 1, col 5.
129 Id.
130 47 Fed. Reg. 49,058 (1982); see also Farnsworth, supra note 128.
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Similarly, on the same day as the United States-EEC Steel Agree-
ment, the Department of Commerce suspended its countervailing duty
investigation against Brazilian steel, based on a United States-Brazilian
agreement to offset with an export tax "all benefits which [the DOC
found] to be subsidies on exports" of steel to the United States. 3 '
However, no agreements were reached with South Africa, and, accord-
ingly, the DOC entered final affirmative countervailing duty determi-
nations and orders against South African steel imported into the
United States.
132
Despite these agreements, however, it is crucial that the DOC con-
tinues to enforce vigorously the countervailing duty and antidumping
law to assure that steel is fairly imported into the United States. In
June, 1982, the Senate passed a concurrent resolution, of which I was a
co-sponsor, that expressed the sense of Congress that the DOC pursue
and conclude promptly what were then the pending steel unfair trade
practices cases. 3 3 Also, the resolution expressed the sense of Congress
that the President should direct the government to pursue vigorously
and conclude promptly the antidumping and countervailing duty cases
then pending investigation, concerning foreign trade practices involv-
ing carbon steel mill products and specialty steel mill products. The
131 47 Fed. Reg. 47,048 (1982).
132 Id at 42,369, 47,900.
133 S. Con. Res. 100, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The text of this resolution, which passed the
Senate on June 22, 1982, is as follows:
Whereas the steel industry of the United States is critical to the national defense and to
the maintenance of a strong industrial economy, which employs millions of workers and sus-
tains the Nation's prosperity;
Whereas between 1971 and the present there have been three distinct episodes of dra-
matic surges in importation of apparently dumped and subsidized steel mill products, epi-
sodes which contributed to the destruction of 118,000 steelmaking jobs, to the shrinking of
production by 20 percent, and to aborted capital investment planned to modernize the steel
industry;
Whereas the 1981-1982 episode, which is the most serious, has contributed to 100,000
layoffs and 31,000 workers on short work-weeks and threatens to abort $700,000,000 in
planned capital investment; and
Whereas the past failure of the United States Government to vigorously enforce the
trade laws has contributed to the decline of the steel industry, and the failure of the Govern-
ment to so enforce the trade laws in this most serious crisis in the steel industry would endan-
ger critical planned investment and modernization, which in turn would threaten the
economy and the national defense of the United States: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate (the House o/Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of
the Congress that-
(1) the President should exercise the authority granted to him by the Congress to direct the
appropriate agencies to vigorously pursue and promptly conclude the countervailing duty
and antidumping duty investigations being conducted under Title VII of the Tariff Act of
1930, and the investigation being conducted under Chapter 1 of Title III of the Trade Act of
1974, concerning foreign trade practices involving carbon steel mill products and specialty
steel mill products; and
(2) the Congress, if necessary, should promptly consider appropriate legislation to
strengthen the trade laws of the United States.
128 CoNG. REc. S.7263 (daily ed. June 22, 1982).
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resolution further stated that "the Congress, if necessary, should
promptly consider appropriate legislation to strengthen the trade laws
of the United States." 134 The message in the concurrent resolution is
very clear: Congress will take action to enforce our trade laws that
apply to steel if the DOC does not expeditiously carry out antidumping
and countervailing duty investigations.
Considering how long DOC countervailing duty investigations
take and how extensive the investigations are, it is important for Con-
gress to signal that it is very serious about strong enforcement of our
trade laws. International trade in steel must remain free and fair.
V. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS RELATING TO
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
There is growing concern in Congress that the United States is
being treated unfairly in international trade, that United States exports
do not receive the same treatment that we give to other countries' ex-
ports, and that the United States does not receive reciprocity in foreign
trade.
Over the years, countries have recognized the need for interna-
tional agreement on foreign trade regulation. In November 1947,
twenty-three countries concluded the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) in Geneva.135 GATT established a set of rules to
guide international trade, and set up an institutional framework to con-
duct trade negotiations.
The Trade Act of 1974,136 provides for the United States to partici-
pate in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN).'37 During consid-
eration of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Congress expressed
concern that existing GATT mechanisms might not improve the pro-
cess of settling of trade disputes. 138 In an effort to ensure enforcement
134Id §2.
135 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
136 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975)amendedby Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144.
137 See Id § 101, 88 Stat. at 1982.
138 See A. REiEMAN & R. AHERN, RECIPROCITY iN FOREiGN TRADE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV-
ICE ISSUE BRIEF No. 1B82043, UPDATE (1982) (a copy of this source is on file in the offices of the
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business). Among the bills pending at the time,
several dealt generally with reciprocity: H.R. 5514, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (Dingell); H.R.
5596,97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (Frenzel, et. al); H.R. 5727, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (Gaydos)
(similar to S.2251, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)); S.2067, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (Symms) (iden-
tical bilt H.R. 4407, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (Schulze)); S.2071, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
(Pressler) (similar to H.R. 5727, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) and S.2347, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982) (Byrd, R.)). In addition to these, there were several reciprocity bills which dealt specifically
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of United States rights under the GATT agreements, and to challenge
foreign unfair trade practices, Congress amended section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 to give the President the power to retaliate against
"unjustifiable" or "unreasonable" foreign trade practices. 139 Section
301 is now a powerful tool in the hands of the President, which he can
use unilaterally if he deems it appropriate. The 1974 Trade Act also
extends protection to American industry which faces heavy imports or
unfair trade practices from other nations, and regulates United States
trade with Communist countries.
t40
The evolution which has made non-tariff barriers, or distortions of
non-tariff barriers, the primary barriers to international trade has also
made reciprocity increasingly more complex. The trade problem was
relatively simple to understand and deal with when tariffs were the
only issue, since tariffs were highly visible. Today, tariffs are not im-
portant because they are low, and, for most goods, roughly equal be-
tween the major industrial countries.
Non-tariff trade barriers now include government subsidies, gov-
ernment procurement practices, regulations, tax preferences, and cul-
tural factors which result in discrimination against foreign suppliers in
favor of domestic ones. Governments may design measures to favor
domestic producers, or they may design measures to achieve other na-
tional goals (such as pure food and drug or environmental standards),
and have the incidental effect of restricting or distorting international
trade. Adding to this problem is the difficulty of quantifying and eval-
uating the impact of non-tariff barriers on foreign trade.
Many in the United States are now arguing that diplomatic chan-
nels, GATT procedures, and the new codes concluded in 1979 under
the MTN' 4' have failed and probably will continue to fail to produce a
universal reduction of all forms of trade barriers. 142 They point out
that while the United States market is the most open market in the
world, we are losing much more than we gain through our open market
policy.
In part, the United States faces its current trade problems because
with individual sectors of the economy. The sectors focused upon included the telecommunica-
tions industry (H.R. 5158, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) and S. 898, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982));
high technology (H.R. 5579, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), S.2283, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), and
S.2356, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)); and agriculture (H.R. 5860, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) and
H.R. 6072, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)).
139 19 U.S.C. § 241 I(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
140 Id.
141 For materials discussing the codes concluded under the 1979 MTN, see supra note 115.
142 See Pine, U.S. Worries That Nov. 24 G42T Parley Will Increase Protectionism, Not Trade,
Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1982, at 28.
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of inadequate assumptions by United States policymakers that recipro-
cal action by other countries would accompany the massive reductions
in United States trade barriers since 1934. Reciprocity has often been
interpreted to mean that concessions by foreign governments would in-
crease United States exports as much as United States concessions
would increase United States imports. This, of course, has not oc-
curred. Indeed, balancing (or reciprocal) concessions, commodity by
commodity or country by country, is inconsistent with the concept of
comparative advantage. Thus, it should not be surprising that the re-
sult of balanced reciprocity has been trade imbalances from country to
country and from commodity to commodity.
VI. S.2094, THE RECIPROCAL TRADE AND
INVESTMENT ACT OF 1982
In order to overcome the current problem of trade imbalance fac-
ing the United States, over twenty bills have been introduced in the
ninety-seventh Congress, all with the aim of achieving the same ease of
United States exports of goods, services to, and United States invest-
ment in foreign markets as foreign nations in United States markets.
One such bill is S.2094, the Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act of
1982.' 41 S.2094 has the following stated legislative purposes: (1) to fos-
ter United States economic growth and full employment by expanding
United States exports by achieving fair and equitable market opportu-
nities in foreign markets;'" (2) to improve the President's ability to
identify and analyze foreign barriers to and restrictions on United
States trade and investment, and eliminating such barriers to trade;
145
(3) to encourage the President to expand international trade in services
by negotiating agreements to eliminate barriers to such trade; 4 6 and
(4) to enhance the free flow of foreign direct investment capital, by
having the President negotiate international investment agreements
that reduce or eliminate the trade-distorting effects of certain invest-
ment-related measures. 147
Section 3 of the bill would add a new section 181 to the Trade Act
of 1974 designed to reduce barriers to market access. It would require
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to conduct an annual
study of foreign barriers to United States exports and foreign direct
investment by United States citizens and nationals, to estimate the
143 S.2094, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S.680 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1982).(1982).
144 Id. § 2(1).
145 Id. § 2(2).
146 Id. § 2(3).
147 Id. § 2(4).
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trade impact of such barriers, to report annually to Congress on these
matters, and to consult with Congress on trade policy priorities for ex-
panding foreign market opportunities.'48
Section 4 of the bill would amend title III of the 1974 Trade Act,
which currently authorizes the President to take certain retaliatory
measures in response to unfair foreign trade practices. 149  The bill
would also expand section 301 of the Trade Act to allow the President
to respond to offending foreign trade practices by targeting his actions
to any product or sector, regardless of whether it was involved in the
offending practice.'-" In addition, the bill would clarify section 301 to
specifically authorize the imposition of fees and restrictions on the sup-
pliers of foreign services at the President's discretion. The President
148 Id. § 3.
149 Id. § 4 (to amend 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. V 1981)).
15o Section 301 of the Trade Act currently provides as follows:
Sec. 301. Determination and Action by President
(a) Determinations Requiring Action if the President determines that action by the United
States is appropriate-
(1) to enforce the rights of the United States under any trade agreement; or
(2) to respond to any act, policy, or practice of a foreign country or instrumentality
that-
(A) is inconsistent with the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United
States under, any trade agreement, or
(B) is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United
States commerce;
the President shall take all appropriate and feasible action within his power to enforce such
rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, or practice. Action under this section
may be taken on a nondiscriminatory basis or solely against the products or services of the
foreign country or instrumentality involved.
(b) Other Action
Upon making a determination described in subsection (a) of this section, the President, in
addition to taking action referred to in such subsection, may-
(1) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, or refrain from proclaiming, ben-
efits of trade agreement concessions to carry out a trade agreement with the foreign country
or instrumentality involved; and
(2) impose duties or other import restrictions on the products of, and fees or restrictions
on the services of, such foreign country or instrumentality for such time as he determines
appropriate.
(c) Presidential Procedures
(1) Action on Own Motion
If the President decides to take action under this section and no petition requesting action on
the matter involved has been filed under section 302, the President shall publish notice of his
determination, including the reasons for the determination in the Federal Register. Unless he
determines that expeditious action is required, the President shall provide an opportunity for
the presentation of views concerning the taking of such action.
(2) Action Requested by Petition
Not later than 21 days after the date on which he receives the recommendation of the
Trade Representative under section 304 of this title with respect to a petition, the President
shall determine what action, if any, he will take under this section, and shall publish notice of
his determination, including the reasons for the determination, in the Federal Register.
(d) Special Provisions
(1) Definition of Commerce
For purposes of this section, the term "commerce" includes, but is not limited to, services
associated with international trade, whether or not such services are related to specific
products.
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would handle fees for restrictions under the 1974 Trade Act's "fast-
track" procedures.
151
S.2094 would expand section 302 of the Trade Act to allow the
USTR to initiate section 301 investigations, which, under current law,
may be initiated on the basis of a petition filed by an "interested per-
son."'152 However, the bill would require the USTR to undertake pri-
vate sector consultations before taking such action. The present section
303 international consultation procedure links-domestic section 301 ac-
tions to the consultation and dispute settlement mechanism of the
GATT. 153
The bill would also amend section 303 of the 1974 Trade Act1 4 to
allow a temporary (i.e., 90 day) delay between the initiation of a section
301 investigation and the request for consultations with an offending
foreign government, for which the section currently provides.155 In ad-
dition, the bill would enact a new provision to ensure the confidential-
ity of certain business information made available to the USTR in
connection with a section 301 proceeding.'
56
Section 301 of the 1974 Act would be further amended to provide
definitions for the terms "unreasonable," "unjustifiable," and "discrim-
inatory." "Unreasonable" practices would include those that do not vi-
olate United States trade agreement rights, but which are otherwise
deemed to be unfair and inequitable, including practices denying fair
and equitable market opportunities, opportunities for the establishment
of an enterprise, and the provision of adequate protection of industrial
property rights.' 57 An "unjustifiable" practice would be one that would
violate or be inconsistent with rights established under United States
trade agreements.' 58 "Discriminatory" practices would be those that
deny national or most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to United
States products, services, or investments.159 In addition, S.2094 would
redefine the term "commerce" to include specifically foreign direct in-
vestment by United States citizens or nationals "with implications for
trade in products or services."'
160
Sections 5 through 7 of S.2094 would add a new section 104A to
151 S.2094, supra note 144, § 4(a).
152 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. V 1981).
153 Id § 2412. See also deKieffer, supra note 89, at 327-33.
154 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. V 1981).
155 S.2094, supra note 143, § 4(d).
156 Id. § 4(f) (to amend 19 U.S.C. § 2415 (Supp. V 1981)).
15 Id. § 4(e)(3).
158 Id. § 4(e)(4).
159 Id. § 4(e)(5).
160 Id. § 4(e)(1).
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the 1974 Trade Act, to deal with international trade in services, foreign
direct investment, and high technology. Section 5 would give the Presi-
dent the authority to negotiate an international agreement on trade in
services with the aim of reducing or eliminating barriers to or distor-
tions of such trade, and to develop internationally agreed-upon rules,
including dispute settlement procedures that are consistent with United
States commercial policies, and that will ensure open trade in serv-
ices.' 6 1 The bill would require the USTR to develop and coordinate
United States policy on service trade, and have United States agencies
advise the USTR on foreign barriers to such trade. 6 ' In addition, the
Commerce Department would establish a Service Industry Develop-
ment Program that would, inter alia, promote United States export of
services and collect and analyze information regarding United States
competitiveness in services.' 63 Finally, section 6 would require the
USTR to consult with the states before entering into any negotiations
on an international agreement on trade in services. 164
Section 7 of S.2094 would authorize the President to negotiate an
international foreign direct investment agreement aimed at reducing or
eliminating artificial or trade distorting barriers to foreign direct invest-
ment, to expand the principle of national treatment, and to develop
international rules to ensure a free flow of foreign direct investment.
65
Section 8 would give the President the authority to negotiate an
international agreement on trade in high technology products that is
similar to the agreements mentioned above. Negotiating objectives
would include the reduction and elimination of all tariffs on, and other
barriers to, imports of high technology products and related services.
This would include, but not be limited to, the acceleration of the full
concession tariff rates on high technology products agreed to during the
Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 16 6 and the modifica-
tion, elimination, or continuance of any tariff on high technology prod-
ucts in effect on the date of enactment of S.2094.167 The bill also
envisions that such high technology agreements would be aimed to
achieve joint scientific cooperation and minimum safeguards for the
acquisition and enforcement of industrial property rights. The bill
would provide additional negotiating authority to reduce certain tariffs
161 Id. § 5(a).
162 Id. § 6(a)(1).
163 Id. § 6(b).
164 Id. § 6(c).
165 Id. § 7.
166 Id. § 8(a); for materials discussing the Tokyo Round, see supra note 115.
167 S.2094, supra note 143, § 8(b).
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on high technology products. 168 Finally, S.2094 would require the De-
partment of Commerce to conduct a study analyzing factors that influ-
ence United States competitiveness in high technology industries, and
to report its findings to Congress.
169
A. Issues Raised by S.2094
S.2094, as reported to the Finance Committee, is a milder version
of the original bill which Senators Danforth and Heinz introduced.
170
S.2094 is unlikely to offend United States trading partners, since it does
not establish the principle that United States goods and services must
be given "substantially equivalent market access"' 17 1 to that which the
United States gives foreign products. By weakening this bill, support-
ers hope to send a signal to Japan that the United States is still willing
to negotiate to eliminate Japanese trade barriers before it resorts to
harsh retaliatory measures.
As of April, 1983, the future of S.2094 is unclear. The bill, which
-the Administration supports, was sent by the Finance Committee to the
full Senate on June 30, 1982. Some believe that protectionist amend-
ments will be offered to the bill on the floor which will harm the pros-
pects of passing S.2094. The most likely amendment at this time is
S.2300,172 the Fair Practices in Automotive Products Act, which would
require manufacturers with certain sales volumes in the United States
to maintain a certain percent of American-made parts in each automo-
bile which they sell in the United States. The Administration and
sponsors of S.2094 oppose S.2300. Indeed, Senator Danforth has said
that he would withdraw S.2094 should an amendment such as S.2300
be added.
Although the Administration realizes the need for fair trade, some
officials are concerned that reciprocity legislation other than S.2094,
which allows unilateral retaliation, will erode world trade and will ad-
versely affect the relations between the United States and its trading
partners. United States Special Trade Representative Brock has
warned the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Trade that such "a dis-
torted use of reciprocity could undermine an already vulnerable multi-
lateral trading system, trigger retaliation abroad, further deprive the
168 Id. § 8(c).
169 Id. § 8(b).
170 Senator Heinz' original bill was S.2071, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
171 The language "substantially equivalent" market access appeared in the earlier version of
the Heinz-Danforth bill, S.2094, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(2), 128 CONG. REc. S.680 (daily ed. Feb.
10, 1982).
172 S.2300, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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United States of export markets and erode, if not eliminate, our role as
the world leader in liberalizing international trade." '173 Any proposed
legislation, Ambassador Brock noted, "must be absolutely consistent
with current obligations under the GATT, and other international
agreements . . .[and] must [also] stress multilateral rather than bilat-
eral or sectoral solutions."'
' 7 4
VII. CONCLUSION: UNITED STATES PERFORMANCE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE PROS AND CONS OF
RECIPROCITY LEGISLATION
The United States remains the world's leading economic power.
Though we have suffered deficits in our balance of payments in recent
years, many factors produced those deficits. The factors include our
lagging productivity, declines in savings and investment, declines in re-
search and development, high interest rates which have increased the
value of the United States dollar relative to other currencies, and ad-
vances in technology and labor productivity in other countries. Unfair
trade practices by other countries explain only a small portion of the
lagging United States performance in international trade.
In addition, United States policies with respect to some industries
have themselves created major trade barriers which burden our own
consumers, as well as foreign nations' economies. Our current sugar
program is such a trade barrier, since it raises prices to domestic con-
sumers, contributes to inflation, and lowers domestic productivity. The
program also makes it more difficult for countries with a comparative
advantage in sugar production to export their crop to the United States.
This directly harms our ability to achieve other stated foreign policy
objectives, and conflicts with our often stated goal of a free and fair
international market.
In the international market for steel products, however, the United
States steel industry has suffered from lack of competitiveness partially
because of other nations' unfair trade policies. While many of the legal
challenges to such' policies are yet to be resolved, Congress has re-
sponded to the policies with a fairly large number of legislative propos-
als, many of them protectionist. These proposals would damage the
operation of the international market.
Policymakers have now developed a new approach-that of "reci-
procity"-like that embodied in S.2094. Their concept of "reciprocity"
173 A. REIFMAN & R. AHERN, supra note 138, at 2.
174 Id.
175 See generally supra note 138.
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is difficult to challenge because they seem to base their proposals on
principles of fairness and equity. Proponents of "reciprocity" argue
that for trade to be free, it must also be fair.
However, the definition of "reciprocity" in some of the current leg-
islative proposals represents a change from the one embodied in United
States trade laws, practiced since at least 1934, and agreed to interna-
tionally by GATT. Before, reciprocity meant equal reductions in trade
barriers. Yet now some would redefine reciprocity to mean equal levels
of trade barriers. In addition, it can be argued that reciprocity, as cur-
rent proposals define it, is something for the United States to practice
unilaterally, since the definition allows the United States to assume for
itself the right to decide which foreign practices are unjustified, and the
right to retaliate against "unjustified" practices. But, if the United
States acted in this way, other countries would soon do the same. The
pattern of escalating trade barriers that would result, of course, could
lead to a full-scale trade war.
Another problem with the proposed definition of reciprocity is that
the retaliation that it might bring about would have costs. Should the
United States impose high import duties, other countries are likely to
boycott United States exports. In addition, advocates of the "new' rec-
iprocity intend to direct it against any offending country, regardless of
its economic needs, or previously favored status. This would mark a
move away from the unconditional most-favored-nation treatment
which many developing nations receive under the GATT.
One last major concern is that many of the "new" reciprocity pro-
posals would be difficult to administer. To obtain reciprocity in foreign
trade under the new approach, the United States must examine the for-
eign trade restrictions that a foreign country imposes on United States
exporters or investors, and then impose the same restrictions on the
foreign country. However, such reciprocity is likely to be difficult to
implement since the United States economy is different from many of
the economies of the countries which have raised barriers against
United States exporters and investors.
Yet, despite arguments against reciprocity, new legislation is
needed. Presently, the United States has the most open market in the
world. The United States example of openness, its diplomatic efforts,
the GATT, and the new GATT codes of conduct may have opened
foreign markets, but it has not opened them to the same degree as
United States markets. Protectionism in Japan, Europe (particularly
evidenced by the Common Agricultural Policy), Canada (especially in
the area of foreign investment), and in many developing countries con-
tinues to limit world trade in general, and to limit United States exports
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in particular. Because the United States has few barriers left to elimi-
nate in return for foreign concessions, the United States must try a new
and more aggressive trade strategy. The threat of retaliation, embodied
in the amendments to S.2094 strengthening section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974, must be employed to provide the President with the neces-
sary negotiating leverage to reduce foreign trade barriers. Such posi-
tive trade reciprocity-reciprocity in the long-established sense-would
challenge the rest of the world to liberalize trade policies, through the
threat of unilateral United States action.
We must be cautious that the United States take unilateral actions
to redress other nations' unfair trading practices only when the dis-
puted practice is a clear violation of the GATT or of some other trade
agreement. A regulated trading order respected by all nations is, in the
long run, to the benefit of all, because it removes uncertainty and estab-
lishes clear rules of conduct. Furthermore, it lends a supranational
legitimacy to trade actions.
Since the United States is the world's leading economic power and
trading nation, it must take the lead in protecting the orderly operation
of the international marketplace. Today, there is ample flexibility in
international trade laws to seek redress for most unfair trading prac-
tices. Where existing law is inadequate, there are orderly procedures
which we can use to press for clarifications and additions. The United
States has a strong interest in protecting and maintaining the basic
structure of international trade, and it must see that the framework
continues to accommodate the established principle of reciprocity. We
must ensure that reciprocity continues to fit within established interna-
tional trade laws, and oppose efforts to redefine reciprocity, so that
countries cannot use it as a pretext for disregarding those laws.
In contrast to protectionist attempts to redefine reciprocity, the rec-
iprocity proposals in the Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act of 1982,
S.2094, are moderate and fall short of outright protectionism. While
other legislation attempts to compel foreign countries to open their
markets to a level "substantially equivalent" to the United States mar-
ket, S.2094 attempts to clarify and expand existing law, and stresses
positive reciprocity through multilateral negotiation.
Unfortunately, the GATT Ministerial Meeting of November,
1982, suggests that GATT will need to be strengthened if it is to be
successful in handling many of today's trade problems. 76 Despite
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United States initiatives at the meeting, the GATT does not cover trade
in services and in investments, which are two areas of growing eco-
nomic importance. The Ministerial Meeting failed to deal adequately
with Europe's Common Agricultural Policy, and with Japan's remain-
ing protectionism.1 77 Also, the GATT does not govern United States
trade relations with a number of important countries, such as Mexico,
China, and the U.S.S.R. Consequently, further multinational negotia-
tions will be required if we are to reestablish a framework for a free
and fair international trading system.
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